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Abstract: The major constraint in developing appropriate monitoring methodologies and tools to assess the level of safety in 
en-route airspaces where controllers monitor air traffic by means of radar surveillance and provide aircraft with tactical 
instructions lies in the estimation of the operational risk. The operational risk estimate normally relies on incident reports 
provided by the air navigation service providers (ANSPs). The provision of incident reports is highly dependent on the 
safety management practices of each ANSP and requires the complete cooperation of both controllers (in identifying and 
reporting altitude deviations) and incident investigators (in providing operational reports to the RMA in good time). The 
EUROCONTROL 2009 SRC Annual Safety Report concludes that whilst "there has been an improvement in reporting of 
safety occurrences, overall progress towards full reporting by states is too slow." 
This paper presents a new and innovative approach to assessing aircraft safety level within En-route Airspaces based upon 
the process and analysis of radar tracks. The proposed methodology has been designed to complement the information 
collected in the accident and incident databases, thereby providing the following information inferred from the in depth 
assessment of proximate events. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
EUROCONTROL has worked in the last years to 
implement as a software prototype tool the 3-D collision 
risk model (CRM). The 3-D collision risk model was 
developed as a general mathematical framework to assess 
the level of safety in continental en-route airspace, where 
controllers monitor air traffic by means of radar 
surveillance and provide aircraft with tactical instructions 
as required for safety or operational reasons [l].with the 
necessary skills and experience to achieve the challenge of 
automation. This paper presents the work which is 
currently carried out by CRIDA and the Polytechnic 
University of Madrid on this model. 
The objective of the software prototype tool is not only to 
eventually produce an estimation of the level of safety 
achieved in the airspace under assessment but also to 
provide safety-related metrics and trends, which can be 
monitored over time. 
¡, radar data, level of safety 
LI A Brief Introduction to CRMs 
The risk of collision between aircraft was initially studied 
in the early 1960s by B. L. Marks [2] and P. G. Reich [3]. 
The Reich model assesses the collision risk for an airway 
structure consisting of one or more parallel routes. ICAO 
has used the Reich model with some minor modifications 
to, for example, assess the minimum safe separations 
between parallel routes in the North Atlantic Organised 
Track System [4]. 
However, the main problem with the application of the 
Reich CRM in the European airspace is that the model 
assumes procedural control and takes no account of the 
intervention capability of Air Traffic Control (ATC) to 
monitor and prevent conflicts and hence collisions. 
In the past years great effort has been invested in the 
development and improvement of Collision Risk Models. 
Some authors have extended the original Reich model 
(Anderson/Karppinen [5] 1994, Bakker/Blom [6] 1993). 
Others researchers have worked on new models applied to 
different geographic regions (i.e. USA [7], en-route 
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controlled airspace [8]), to different flight regimes (i.e. 
landing on closely [9] and ultra closely spaced runways 
[10]), to specific flight phases (i.e. separation between 
aircraft on final approach and landing [11]), to different 
types of separation (vertical and longitudinal as well as 
lateral) and to current and future operational concepts [12]. 
Nevertheless none of the previous models is appropriate to 
assess and monitor the level of safety in high density en-
route radar airspaces using as a sole source of input data 
the recorded aircraft trajectories. Traditional approaches to 
Collision Risk Models (CRM), generally based upon 
statistical or probabilistic concepts do not capture the 
complexity inherent to an operational radar environment 
like the one in Europe, with high amount of traffic, a large 
number of crossings tracks, climbing and descending 
aircrafts and complicated route structure. It has to be 
noticed that, besides its importance and potentiality for 
safety level assessment, not too much effort have been 
devoted until now to the development of risk and collision 
models based upon the analysis of the stored aircraft tracks 
that have flown in it within a given time frame. 
1.2 Need for a New Collision Risk Model 
On behalf of ICAO, EUROCONTROL has been acting as 
the European Regional Monitoring Agency (EUR RMA) 
since the reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM) 
was implemented in Europe. The EUR RMA continuously 
monitors RVSM operations and provides an annual 
estimate of the overall vertical collision risk for the EUR 
RVSM airspace. A collision risk model is used to provide 
that estimate. The major constraint of the methodology lies 
in the estimation of the operational risk. The operational 
risk estimate relies on altitude deviation reports provided 
by the air navigation service providers (ANSPs). The 
provision of altitude deviation reports is highly dependent 
on the safety management practices of each ANSP and 
requires the complete cooperation of both controllers (in 
identifying and reporting altitude deviations) and incident 
investigators (in providing operational reports to the RMA 
in good time). The EUROCONTROL 2009 SRC Annual 
Safety Report [13] concludes that whilst "there has been an 
improvement in reporting of safety occurrences, overall 
progress towards full reporting by states is too slow." 
Consequently, the EUR RMA sought an alternative method 
to assess operational risk, and a method of assessing the 
operational collision risk due to all causes for European 
en-route airspace has been developed using radar data. The 
basis of this method is a 3-dimensional mathematical 
framework (3-D CRM) developed in 2000 [14]. 
The two main features of the 3-D CRM are that it does not 
rely on altitude deviation reports for the assessment of 
operational risk and that it explicitly accounts for the effect 
of ATC/aircrew intervention in European en-route airspace 
within radar cover and under tactical control. A major 
element of the development of the 3-D CRM for European 
airspace is therefore to quantify the role of ATC (and 
aircrews) in preventing mid-air collisions. 
A basic problem in collision risk modeling is that, 
fortunately, collisions between aircraft are rare events. The 
3-D CRM relates aircraft collision events, therefore, to 
more frequently occurring events involving pairs of aircraft 
for which the 3-D distance between the aircraft is less than 
a horizontal proximity distance, say, , and a vertical 
proximity distance, say, . The values of and are to be 
chosen such that the proximate event frequency can be 
estimated from the radar data with a high level of precision 
and confidence. These more frequently occurring events 
are called proximate events. 
Conflicts and potential conflicts are examples of proximate 
events with the proximity distances and taken as the 
prevailing horizontal and vertical separation minima 
respectively, i.e. a conflict is taken to mean a simultaneous 
violation of horizontal and vertical separation minima and 
a potential conflict is a situation which would result in 
conflict if not corrected within a given look-ahead time 
(LAT) by the ATC and aircrew of one or both aircraft. In 
other words, a potential conflict is a situation where 
aircraft on conflicting paths would lose both vertical and 
horizontal separation within the look-ahead time. 
Given that an aircraft pair is involved in a proximate event, 
the 3-D CRM then models the probability of the event 
developing into a collision, i.e. a situation in which the 
minimum horizontal and vertical distance between the 
centers of the aircraft is less than the average aircraft 
length denoted Xxy and the average aircraft height denoted 
Xz. 
This probability is modeled as the product of two 
conditional probabilities, namely the probability that a 
potential conflict results in an actual conflict and the 
probability that, once a conflict has occurred, a collision 
follows. This can be expressed as: 
P(collision | potential conflict) = P(collision | conflict) x 
P(conflict | potential conflict). 
More precisely, the conditional probability P(conflict | 
potential conflict) assumes that no corrective action to 
prevent the conflict is taken by either aircraft and that they 
continue in straight flight at constant speed at least until 
the closest point of approach (CPA). Similarly, the 
conditional probability P(collision | conflict) assumes a 
failure of the ATC/aircrew safety monitoring and 
prevention capability. 
Finally, to complete the definition of the model, look-
ahead time, LAT, is taken to mean the time-horizon within 
which all aircraft positions are projected in order to 
explore the existence of "potential conflicts'5. The main 
trade-off with regard to the look-ahead time is between 
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avoiding the identification of "potential conflicts5' by 
extrapolation too far into the future and between avoiding 
to filter out any risk-bearing potential conflicts. 
A prototype software tool has been developed for the 
benefit of the application of the 3-D CRM framework to 
the assessment of European en-route airspace scenarios 
using radar data. The following sections of this paper 
provide a detailed description of the functionality of this 
prototype tool. 
2. BACKGROUND 
As stated in [15], "accidents are dramatic examples, among 
other less critical events, pointing out how prospective 
assessment methods often poorly represent human and 
organizational aspects and hence limit their value for 
accident prevention". 
According to the above statement a Collision Risk Model 
should give both level of safety figures and useful safety 
metrics to identify "system weaknesses" that require 
mitigation. These metrics are vital in explaining the 
variation in collision risk estimates provided by the model 
upon analyzing different airspaces, or the same airspace in 
different time-periods. 
Nowadays, ANSP and Civil Aviation Authorities (CAA) 
mainly use ATM accident and incident databases to 
monitor and provide evidence of levels of safety. However, 
although these databases are very powerful tools and are 
improving constantly, they still have some weak points that 
need to be considered: 
• Not all incidents are reported by pilots and air traffic 
controllers. In fact, it is very difficult to infer how 
many real incidents have occurred for each one that is 
reported. 
• Incident severity is generally ranked solely on how 
close aircraft get, without considering the geometry of 
the event or other parameters, e.g. closure rate. 
• Incident Classification is not homogeneous in all 
databases. Furthermore, special care has to be taken to 
train database personnel so that the same classification 
criteria always apply. 
Sometimes the evolution of a mid-air incident is very 
complex making it difficult to capture all of the 
information relating to this incident in a database. 
A major objective of the 3-D CRM tool is to complement 
the information collected in the accident and incident 
databases, thereby providing: 
• Identification of all proximate events based on radar 
data. 
• Complete classification of all proximate events using 
clear and consistent criteria. 
• Detailed information on the evolution of each 
proximate event. 
• Collision risk estimate 
3. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE 3-D CRM 
PROTOTYPE SOFTWARE TOOL 
The objective of the 3-D CRM prototype software tool is 
to process the radar data in order to eventually provide an 
estimate of the operational risk in the airspace under 
assessment. In the development of the 3-D CRM software 
prototype tool, the following criteria have been taken into 
account: 
• The capability to handle large amounts of radar data in 
an efficient way with a high level of automation; 
• The provision of a user-friendly interface; 
• The provision of a graphical interface to visualise 
potential conflicts and conflict areas; and 
• A modular development to allow different modules to 
be run either individually or jointly. 
The 3-D CRM tool processes are grouped into two main 
functionalities that can be run independently or 
sequentially: the Radar Data Processing (RDP) Module, 
and the Safety Metrics Estimation (SFE) Module. 
The RDP Module reads the radar data in ASTERIX format 
performs track segmentation and identifies all proximate 
events within a selected scenario. 
The SME Module calculates all the parameters of the 
mathematical model; providing estimates of the probability 
of collision within the scenario and several other safety 
metrics. 
3-D CRM Software Tool Processes: 
RadarData Processing Module 
Radar Data Files 
Parameter Estimation Module 
Figure 1. 3-D CRM Software Tool 
4. RADAR DATA PROCESSING 
The basic input data required to run this module of the 3-D 
CRM prototype software tool are radar data files, but the 
prototype software tool can also handle flight plan data, if 
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available, to optimise the performance of some of its 
functions (e.g. identification of military traffic). 
The processing of radar data poses two major problems, 
namely: 
• the large amount of information held to represent the 
track followed by each aircraft; and 
• the complexity of the proximate event identification 
and characterisation. , which is carried out using 
algorithms of the short-term conflict alert (STCA) 
type to determine the distance between the actual or 
potential (projected) position of each aircraft, and the 
positions of all other aircraft at that moment. 
These problems can be simplified, given that, in the 
scenarios corresponding to en-route airspace, most aircraft 
behave in a fairly regular manner, with "segmented" paths. 
This means that the paths are made up of an ordered 
sequence of "straight" sections, with altitude or course 
changes at specific points. In addition, the speed of the 
aircraft in each segment is mainly uniform. To take 
advantage of these characteristics, an aircraft track 
segmentation process has been implemented. The 
identification and analysis of potential conflicts (section 4) 
is based on this aircraft track segmentation (see [1]). 
The radar data pre-processing module therefore comprises 
two different sub-modules to perform important pre-
processing functions: decoding and storage of radar track 
and flight plan files, and track segmentation of radar data. 
4.1 Decoding and storage of radar track and flight 
plan files 
This sub-module decodes all the information contained in 
the selected input files. The minimum set of data needed to 
perform the 3-D CRM calculations is the aircraft state 
vector, consisting of position, velocity, rate of 
climb/descent, flight level, track number and time of track 
information for each aircraft flying into the airspace under 
assessment. 
4.2 Track Segmentation 
The purpose of segmentation is to represent the real track 
of each aircraft by a segmented track, composed of a series 
of segments. The track segmentation process identifies 
when an aircraft is turning, changing its vertical attitude, or 
modifying its speed. Based on this, the full detailed track 
of each aircraft is replaced by a series of line segments 
between the points of change. This segmented track is 
characterised by the sequence of points of change with 
defined coordinates, the times at which an aircraft passes 
the points of change, and the speeds for each segment. 
Each point of the segmented track is supplemented by 
certain characteristics, indicating whether the aircraft is 
starting a turn, finishing a turn, changing attitude, rate of 
climb/descent, speed, etc. 
A segmentation criterion is used that minimises the number 
of segments in the trajectory which represents the real path 
of an aircraft, whilst ensuring that a specified maximum 
error limit is not exceeded at the same time. 
4*3 Proximate Event Identification 
The main task of this function is to identify all the 
proximate events of a scenario. In order to perform this 
task, the following parameters must be introduced in the 3-
D CRM tool: 
1. Scenario Definition: time interval and airspace 
boundaries of the scenario. 
2. Look-ahead time (LAT): is the time horizon within 
which all aircraft positions are projected to explore 
existence of "potential conflicts". The main purpose of 
the look-ahead time is to ensure that "potential 
conflicts" are not identified by extrapolation too far 
into the future. However, it needs to be long enough 
so that no risk-bearing potential conflicts are filtered 
out. After several meetings with air traffic controllers 
and pilots, and careful analysis of the literature (e.g., 
[16]) a look-ahead time of 10 minutes was initially 
chosen for the model. However, the 3-D CRM tool 
allows filtering of events based on any of the model 
parameters. 
3. Conflict Definition: The conflict zone is represented 
by a cylinder of radius R and height 2H centred about 
one of the aircraft, where R and H are the horizontal 
and vertical separation minima. R and H are often 
taken to mean the actual radar separation minima of 5 
NM and 1000 ft applicable in the European airspace. 
• R: radius of the conflict volume 
• H: height of the conflict volume 
4. Collision Definition: Two aircraft, represented by 
cylinders with a circular base of diameter A,xy and 
height Xz, are in collision when the horizontal 
component of the separation vector between their 
centres is within Xxy and the vertical component 
between -Xz and +Xz; in other words, if one aircraft 
(represented by a point at its centre) sits inside a 
cylinder centred on the other aircraft with radius A,xy? 
and height 2XZ. 
• A,xy: Aircraft length (or wingspan if longer) 
• Xz : Aircraft height 
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Figure 2. Collision Definition 
After segmentation of the paths of all aircraft in the 
scenario, two aircraft will be in potential conflict when the 
two following conditions are met at the same time: 
• The vertical separation between the projected 
positions of both aircraft is less than or equal to the 
vertical separation minimum established by H; and 
• The separation in the horizontal plane between the 
projected positions of the aircraft is less than or equal 
to the horizontal separation minimum established by R. 
The formulae to obtain the instant of time of minimum 
separation and the corresponding distance are based on the 
hypothesis of the aircraft flying straight and at constant 
speed. 
5. SAFETY METRICS ESTIMATION 
The following processes are performed in the 3-D CRM 
safety metrics estimation module: 
5.1 Analysis of Proximate Events 
The 3-D CRM tool initially identifies all proximate events 
and then performs an in-depth analysis of each of them, 
thereby determining: 
1) The time that the proximate event was first identified 
(tCi), the predicted time of Closest Point of Approach 
(CPA) (tCPA) and other event information, such as, 
relative speeds between aircraft, real separation at that 
time and vertical and horizontal separation at CPA. To 
illustrate the parameters calculated in the proximity 
analysis, the following figure describes the vertical 
positions and attitudes of two aircraft, in potential 
conflict, flying on the same route. 
_^> 
CPA(tq)11,[r12]q)11,[h12]q)11) 
t q , a : t imeatCPA 
[r12] : horizontal separation nt CPA 
[h12] q>:i: vertical separation at CPA 
[r12]cpa<R& [h12]q>il<H 
tCI: time of identification of potential 
conflict 
Figure 3. Example: First time to identify the proximate event 
2) Turns, changes in the speed or in the vertical attitude 
of the aircraft. Track segmentation identifies a turn or 
change in vertical attitude or speed of the aircraft. The 
analysis carried out by the 3-D CRM tool uses the 
information provided by track segmentation to identify 
the time of a manoeuvre and stores all of the 
parameters associated with this change: relative 
speeds between aircraft, real separation at that time 
and new vertical and horizontal separation at the CPA 
(Fig. 4). 
N e w CPA*(t*
 q)11 ,[l*12] *q)n>[hl2]*q)n) 
Change in the Rate 
of Climb (ROC) 
t
 q)a *: new time at CPA 
[r12]q)a *: new horizontal separation at CPA 
[h12]q,a *: new vertical separation at CPA 
*<R&[h12]q)a*<H 
: time of maneuvre 
Figure 4. Example: Detection of Manoeuvres* Potential Conflict still 
exists» 
3) Manoeuvres performed by the aircraft to erase the 
potential conflict. The software tool identifies what 
type of manoeuvre was performed and when such 
actions were initiated. See Fig. 5-3. 
Climb->Levei 
[hj2]q)a: vertical separation at CPA 
[hi2lcp,>H 
t,-1T T + t,„: time of a conflict resolution manoeuvre 
LCI \ u t C R l_J5 
Figure 5. Example: Detection of Manoeuvre. Resolution of Potential 
Conflict. 
4) The time when two aircraft enter in conflict (ÍCF). The 
software tool monitors the actual separation between 
the aircraft and detects when they simultaneously 
loose both horizontal and vertical separation. The tool 
stores all of the information related to this event. 
r12: actual horizontal separation 
h12: actual vertical separation 
rl2 <R&h 1 2 =H 
fcl trn *C] t,„: time to entry into conflict volume 
Figure 6. Example: Loss of both horizontal and vertical separation. 
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5) Activation of traffic alert and collision avoidance 
system (TCAS) and the short-term conflict alert 
system (STCA). The software tool tries to reproduce 
the logic of the TCAS and the STCA to identify 
situations in which it is believed that a TCAS 
resolution advisory, a TCAS traffic advisory or an 
STCA alert would have been triggered. 
6) When the distance between a pair of aircraft increases 
as a function of time, the pair is said to be diverging. 
A diverging pair is no longer analysed, provided that 
the present separation is equal to or greater than the 
horizontal separation minima. 
As a result, the 3-D CRM prototype software tool 
calculates and stores for each proximate event: the time of 
identification of a potential conflict (tCi), the start of a 
conflict resolution manoeuvre (ÍCR), the predicted time of 
entry into the conflict volume (ÍCF)J and the predicted time 
of CPA (ÍCPA). It also tries to distinguish whether no action 
was taken, or whether the potential conflict was resolved 
either by an action in the horizontal plane or by one in the 
vertical plane 
Once the analysis of the proximate event is complete, the 
3-D CRM prototype tool automatically generates a report 
describing the proximate event in terms of the changes in 
the main parameters. 
5.2 Classification of Proximate Events 
The 3-D CRM prototype software tool classifies proximate 
events on the basis of the following criteria: nature, traffic 
type, vertical regime, relative heading, aircraft reaction 
and activated alert system (TCAS, STCA). 
The information for the last criterion (activated alert 
system) is obtained from analysis of times-to-go to CPA. 
This classification is essential in order to carry out the 
statistical analysis required to provide an estimate of the 
level of collision risk. 
CRITERIA OF CLASSIFICATION OFPUOXIMATK EVENTS 
.NATURE ' l ' , i \pv I C ! X K R T , C A L R E G ! M E 
Conflict 
Potential 
conflict 
Potential 
Collision 
Civil Traffic 
Both 
Military 
Aircraft 
One Military 
Aircraft 
Level-Level 
Climb-Level 
Descend-Level 
Climb-Climb 
Climb-Descent 
Descent-descent 
RKI.ATIVfc: 
1IKAD1NG 
Same 
Opposite 
Crossing 
A'CRKACIION 
Change vertical 
Profile 
Modify Heading 
Change of Speed 
No Reaction 
AC TIN ATLD 
AI.KRT VSTE.M 
TCAS RA 
TCAS TA 
STCA 
No Alert 
Figure 7 Classification of Proximate Events 
5 3 Detection of Activated Alert Systems 
To characterize the severity of a conflict not just by 
infringement of the horizontal and vertical separation 
regulations - actual or potential - the 3-D CRM software 
tool reproduces the logic of the TCAS system to identify if 
and when a TCAS alert was activated. 
The TCAS system is based on time-to-go to CPA, rather 
than distance-to-go to CPA. A warning time or threshold is 
compared with the time-to-go to CPA, computed by 
dividing the slant range, between aircraft, by the closure 
rate. The warning time values are a function of the altitude 
of the aircraft. In an en-route scenario, above FL 200, the 
warning time of a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) is 35 
seconds and for a TCAS Traffic Advisory (TA) 48 seconds 
(see [17] and [18]). 
Furthermore, the algorithms implemented in the 3-D CRM 
software tool have extended the logic of the TCAS system 
to include the logic of the Short Term Conflict Alert 
(STCA) system (see [8]). 
The STCA is also based on Time-to-Go to CPA and 
normally uses a warning time of two minutes, as described 
in [19]. This threshold of two minutes can also be used to 
distinguish between tactical ATC actions (when a 
proximate event is resolved with time-to-go to CPA lower 
than two minutes) and strategic ATC actions (when a 
proximate event is resolved with time-to-go to CPA larger 
than two minutes). 
The logic implemented in the 3-D CRM can be represented 
as follows: 
HORIZONTAL CLOSURE RATE (Knots) 
VERTICAL CLOSURE RATE (fpm) 
Figure 8. TCAS and STCA logic diagrams 
A TCAS RA is activated if the kinetic and geometric 
characteristics of the event in the horizontal and vertical 
planes are in the red area at the same time. 
Although the thresholds or warning times of the Alert 
System considered (TCAS and STCA) are fixed on the 
specifications of each system, a sensitivity test have been 
undertaken to examine the possible effects of using 
different values to the thresholds of the Alert System (i.e. 
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values other than the 120, 48, and 35 sec). Figure 9 shows 
the sensitivity analysis of the identified proximate events 
for different values of look-ahead time using one day's 
radar data from the Maastricht Area of Responsibility 
(AoR): 
Proximate Events vs. Looh-Aheacl Times(min) 
Looh-Ahead Time (min) 
Figure 9. Proximate Events vs. Look-Ahead Time (1 day of traffic, 
Maastricht AoR) 
As can be seen on figure 9 the longer the look-ahead time 
is a higher number of proximate events are identified, 
giving place to false detections. In the conflict detection 
process certain allowances for errors are granted in both 
the track speed and rate of climb, which imply the 
acceptance of a certain number of false alerts. This is 
particularly the case for early detections of proximate 
events when using long look-ahead times. 
5.4 Identification of ATM System Weaknesses 
To provide more comprehensive and accurate information 
on the level of safety of the selected airspace and time 
frame, the 3-D CRM tool calculates several metrics. These 
may be grouped in two categories: 
• Risk context, which provide information on the 
initiating events which lead to potential collisions. 
• Safety metrics, which indicate the effectiveness and 
stress level of safety barriers. 
The risk context metrics represents traffic complexity of a 
selected airspace. It is defined in the 3-D CRM model in 
terms of the following traffic statistics: 
1. Flight-Time: the sum of flight-times of all flights within 
the selected airspace and within a selected time period. 
2. Number of Movements: the numbers of flights within 
the selected airspace and during a selected time period. 
3. Number of Entries and Exits in the selected airspace 
and within a selected time period. 
4. Traffic Density of the selected airspace and during a 
selected time period. 
• Horizontal: obtained using a grid overlay to the 
analyzed airspace. Depending on the number of 
flights flying over each cell, a colour scale is 
displayed with red and yellow denoting the 
highest and lowest figures respectively. 
Figure 10. Maastricht Upper Airspace Traffic Density (1 day if 
traffic).Grid Side Length: 7.5 NM. 
• Vertical: the number of aircraft per flight level, 
can also be displayed using a colour scale. 
5. Route Structure: analysis of the traffic density map 
enables identification of the main flying routes of the 
airspace (without using flight plan data). The route 
structure complexity of a selected airspace can be 
measured using the number of flying routes and the 
percentage of aircraft flying outside the main routes 
during a selected time period. 
6. Evolving Aircraft: percentage of non-level aircraft 
within the selected airspace and during a selected time 
period. 
7. Kinematics: velocity distribution of aircraft flying in 
each of the main flying routes. 
The safety metrics provide complete information of the 
main characteristics associated with the proximate events 
identified within the selected airspace: 
1. Total number of conflicts, number of potential 
collisions and number of potential conflicts within the 
selected airspace and during a selected time period. 
2. Hot Spots: Spatial and Temporal Location of 
Proximate Events. 
3. Classification of Proximate Events by: 
a) Nature: conflicts, potential conflict or potential 
collision, passing event 
b) Traffic Type: civil or military 
c) Vertical Regime: level, climb or descent 
d) Relative Heading: same, opposite or crossing. 
e) A/C Reaction: change vertical profile; modify 
heading or change speed. 
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i) Activated Alert System: TCAS Resolution 
Advisory (RA), TCAS Traffic Advisory (TA) or 
STCAorNoAlert . 
Percentage of potential conflicts resolved in the 
vertical and horizontal planes. 
Correlation between Hot Spots and traffic density 
maps. 
Overall Reaction Time (ti): represents the duration of 
the potential conflict, from the first time that the 
potential conflict is identified (tCi) to the Conflict 
Resolution Time (ÍCR) or the time of entry into conflict 
volume (tCF) if no action is taken to resolve the 
encounter. 
Time-to-Conflict (t2): the period of time between the 
detection of the potential conflict (tCi) and the 
(predicted) time to entry into conflict volume (tCF) 
Time-to-go to the CPA (t3): period of time between 
the detection of the potential conflict (tCI) and the 
(predicted) time of the CPA (ÍCPA)-
t3 :Time-to-goto CPA 
Aircraft 2 
ta: identification of potential conflict 
tCR: start of a conflict resolution manoeuvre 
tCF: predicted time of entry into conflict volume 
tCPA: predicted time of CPA 
[ri2]cPa: horizontal separation at CPA 
— • Predicted trajectory 
Figure 11. Overall Reaction Time, Time to Conflict and Time to CPA 
As an example, using a traffic data sample of 31 days of 
the Maastricht Area of Responsibility, the following figure 
shows a 2D histogram of the time-to-go to CPA (tl) and 
the overall reaction time (t3) obtained from the analysis of 
radar tracks for aircraft pairs in potential conflict: 
n: 
Overall Reaction Time (min) 
The risk context and safety metrics described above can be 
classified into three categories based on their relation with 
the three factors of the mathematical formulation of the 3-
DCRM: 
SAFETY METRICS 
Risk Context 
Flight-Time 
Number of Movements 
Kinematics 
| (Speed, Type of Aircraft) 
Nº of Entries and Exits 
Route structure 
Nº of Potential Conflicts 
Traffic Density 
Number of Routes 
% Evolving Aircraft 
Qualification of Hazards 
Hot Spots 
Nature 
Traffic Type 
Vertical regime 
Relative heading 
A/C Reaction 
Activated Alert System 
(TCAS, STCA) 
Correlation between 
Hot Spots and 
Traffic Density Maps. 
Nº of potential collisions 
Effectiveness of ATC 
Barriers 
Number of Real Conflicts 
Overall Reaction Time 
Time Margin 
Time to Conflict 
Time-to-go to the CPA 
% of Potential Conflicts Solved 
in the vertical plane and in the 
horizontal plane 
Average Nº of Aircraft “near” 
Proximate Events 
Figure 12. 2D histogram of the times-to-go to CPA and overail 
reaction time (31 days of radar data) 
Table 1. List of Safety Metrics 
At present, clear and comprehensive thresholds and 
relationships for the parameters identified in the previous 
table are not yet available in the literature despite the fact 
that several past studies (e.g. Ratcliffe and Ford [20]) have 
attempted to clarify what could be an acceptable value for 
those metrics. Ratcliffe and Ford found in their study that 
hourly conflict rates are proportional to the aircraft 
warning time, the number of aircraft in the study area 
(quadratic function) and inversely proportional to the 
radius of the airspace area (also quadratic). A detailed 
analysis of those metrics is thought to provide a better 
understanding of the operational scenario under assessment 
and by extension a useful tool for ATM service providers. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a new and innovative tool as a first 
step for building up a 3-D Collision Risk Model to 
assessing aircraft safety level within European Airspace 
based upon the process and analysis of radar tracks. 
The 3-D CRM tool has been designed to complement the 
information collected in the accident and incident 
databases, thereby providing the following information 
inferred from the in depth assessment of proximate events: 
1. Identification of all proximate events based on radar 
data. 
2. Complete classification of all proximate events using 
clear and consistent criteria. 
3. Detailed information on the evolution of each 
proximate event. 
4. Safety metrics and other air traffic factors. 
The paper describes the 3-D CRM tool developed to carry 
out this assessment describing its main functions and 
modules. The technical details and methodologies used in 
the assessment are explained and the mayor outputs are 
presented to illustrate the potential of on-route radar data 
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exploitation for Collision Risk Modelling. Further work 
should be carried out to: 
• apply the 3-D CRM too to traffic samples of different 
airspaces and extend the principles of 3-D CRM from 
en-route to Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) 
scenarios; 
• develop a methodology to provide a complete risk 
picture of the scenario, identifying the ATM system 
weakness and characterizing the performance of the 
safety barriers, using all the information provided by 
the 3-D CRM tool that could be used by ATM service 
providers to monitor and improve safety levels in their 
operation; 
• complete an analytical model based on the 3-D CRM 
too to provide true collision risk values. 
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